People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) presents the report of The Independent People’s Tribunal On The Ongoing Ethnic Conflict in Manipur. The report has 12 chapters spread out in 694 pages including a recommendation by the tribunals and a way forwards.
“As far as political restructuring for autonomy maybe concerned or land and citizenship reforms, these must be put on the back burner. What is really needed is a Truth and Reconciliation project to bring both sides together” stated the report.
“We hope this report will help in a small way in forcing the authorities to be accountable towards the people, build mechanisms of reconciliation between communities, restore peace and the loss incurred by families and ensure Justice to the violated” Kavita Srivastava, President PUCL and V. Suresh, General Secretary PUCL.
The People’s Tribunal on the Ethnic Conflict in Manipur documents the origins, nature, and consequences of the devastating violence that began on May 3, 2023, between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities. It identifies the roots of the conflict in deep-seated ethnic divisions, socio-political marginalization, land disputes, and a series of provocative state actions including the Manipur High Court’s directive recommending Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for Meiteis. This order, perceived as a threat by tribal groups, catalyzed protests that were met with violent counter-mobilization. The report emphasizes that the violence was not spontaneous but orchestrated, enabled by armed Meitei vigilante groups like Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, and facilitated by state complicity and law enforcement failures.
The Tribunal presents overwhelming evidence of targeted killings, destruction of homes and places of worship, sexual violence, and the forced displacement of over 60,000 people. It describes the emergence of ethnic enclaves, mass looting of weapons from police armories, and the breakdown of governance, law enforcement, and judicial accountability. Relief efforts were marked by discrimination and neglect, especially in tribal camps. Meanwhile, the health and mental well-being of displaced persons particularly women, children, and the elderly—remain severely compromised. The media and segments of civil society often acted in a partisan manner, spreading misinformation and inflaming hostilities rather than fostering peace.
The report lays out a framework for justice and reconciliation grounded in constitutional safeguards, restorative justice, and global peacebuilding models. It calls for urgent legal accountability, including independent investigations and a Supreme Court-monitored Special Investigation Team (SIT). Long-term peace strategies include stakeholder-based dialogues, the dismantling of armed groups, reparations for victims, and civic education to counter hate. The report concludes that Manipur’s crisis represents not just a regional tragedy, but a national constitutional failure that demands urgent political, legal, and moral redress.
Chapter 1: Setting The Context
This chapter introduces the onset of one of the most serious ethnic conflicts in recent Indian history, beginning on May 3, 2023, in Manipur. The conflict primarily involves the Meitei community, which constitutes the majority in the valley (53% of the population), and the Kuki-Zo community, a minority largely based in the hills (16%). The Nagas (24%) are largely uninvolved but deeply affected.
The conflict’s root causes go beyond immediate triggers. It is embedded in long-standing ethnic rivalries, unresolved land rights issues, demographic anxieties, and political disenfranchisement. The report highlights the failure of both state and central governments to fulfill constitutional obligations. Particularly egregious is the partisan role allegedly played by former Chief Minister N. Biren Singh and the complicity of state security forces in arming non-state actors and allowing widespread violence to occur unchecked.
Militant Meitei groups such as Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun were reportedly instrumental in organizing attacks on Kuki-Zo settlements. Simultaneously, the Kuki-Zo groups also retaliated in the hills. Entire populations have been ethnically cleansed from regions: Meiteis are absent from hill areas, and Kukis are no longer present in the valley. Over 60,000 people have been displaced and now live in under-resourced relief camps.
The chapter documents how sexual violence, including gang rapes, and desecration of religious places have been used as tools of domination. The role of digital media in inflaming tensions through viral videos is emphasized. Political leadership, especially the Prime Minister’s prolonged silence and the Home Minister’s ineffective responses, has contributed to the deepening of the crisis. The tribunal was set up to provide an independent platform to investigate these systemic failures and document the lived experiences of victims.
Chapter 2: Manipur – The State
This chapter delves into the demographic, geographical, and socio-economic structure of Manipur to contextualize the conflict. Manipur is divided into valley and hill regions, with 90% of the land being hilly but inhabited by only 41% of the population. The Meiteis, primarily Hindu, dominate the valley and control political power, while the hill regions are home to Christian-majority tribal groups like Kukis and Nagas.
Census data from 2011 and projected figures illustrate how the population is unevenly distributed along ethnic and religious lines. The Meiteis are not classified as Scheduled Tribes (ST), unlike the Kukis and Nagas. This differential classification has implications for land ownership, access to affirmative action, and political representation.
Economic indicators challenge the narrative that Meiteis are significantly more privileged. While the valley is more urbanized and has slightly better infrastructure, data on poverty levels, literacy rates, and employment suggest that the socio-economic gap between Kukis and Meiteis is not as stark as commonly perceived.
A critical insight from this chapter is the urban-rural divide. While the urban population is mostly Meitei and slightly more advantaged, rural areas, where Kukis dominate, are underdeveloped but not dramatically worse in terms of access to education or services. The complexity of inequality in Manipur defies simplistic ethnic explanations and underscores how the perception of injustice may fuel inter-community tensions.
Chapter 3: Constitutional Status, History, and ST Claims
This chapter explores the legal and historical background of Manipur’s integration into the Indian Union. Manipur had its own constitution and elected assembly even before it formally merged with India in 1949. This unique constitutional history fuels contemporary Meitei nationalism and underlines a long-standing friction with the Indian state.
The chapter scrutinizes the contentious Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status. While the Meiteis argue historical deprivation, tribal groups like the Kukis and Nagas see this as a threat to their constitutional protections and land rights. The High Court order of March 2023 directing the government to recommend ST status for Meiteis acted as a catalyst for mass tribal protests and subsequent violence.
The chapter also evaluates how SC, ST, and OBC reservations function in Manipur, highlighting the uneven distribution of resources and political influence. It critiques the High Court’s order for lacking data-based justification and analyses the volatile aftermath, suggesting that this judicial intervention triggered ethnic insecurities and acted as a flashpoint for conflict.
Chapter 4: Events of Violence
This chapter provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the build-up, eruption, and escalation of ethnic violence in Manipur starting on May 3, 2023. It captures both the long-standing tensions and the immediate sequence of events that led to what the report describes as a state-enabled campaign of ethnic violence.
Drawing from survivor testimonies, civil society documentation, and media reports, this chapter lays bare the systematic nature of the violence, the role of radical groups, the failures of state institutions, and the immense humanitarian fallout that followed.
The seeds of the 2023 violence were sown over several months, even years, through a toxic mix of political agitation, judicial overreach, administrative actions, and hate propaganda.
a. Meitei Demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) Status
• A long-standing demand by sections of the Meitei community to be granted ST status escalated in 2022–2023.
• The claim was fiercely opposed by tribal communities—particularly the Kuki-Zo and Naga groups—who argued that granting ST status to the dominant Meiteis (already enjoying OBC benefits and controlling political and economic levers) would dilute tribal protections and enable Meitei access to reserved forest and hill lands.
b. March 27, 2023 – Manipur High Court Order
• The tipping point came when the Manipur High Court directed the State Government to recommend ST status for Meiteis to the Centre.
• The order was passed without robust anthropological data or tribal consultation, and was widely perceived as judicial overreach.
• It triggered immediate protest from tribal communities, who viewed it as a direct threat to their constitutional safeguards.
c. Other Escalating Factors
• Illegal eviction drives in tribal areas and forest lands were aggressively carried out by the State Government under Chief Minister N. Biren Singh. These were perceived by tribal groups as anti-Kuki moves, particularly when they coincided with aerial surveys and bulldozing of villages alleged to be encroachments.
• A series of hate campaigns labeling Kuki-Zo people as “illegal immigrants,” “narco-terrorists,” and “foreigners” created a hostile atmosphere. These narratives were amplified by Meitei nationalist groups and echoed by state officials.
• Communal media content, including YouTube channels and Facebook pages, spread alarmist and dehumanizing messages.
• Tribal protests were often met with state repression, and peaceful gatherings faced arrests or use of force.
This background created a volatile environment, where ethnic mistrust had peaked and institutional mediation had failed. Against this backdrop, the events of May 3 served as the match that lit the fire.
A peaceful protest march organized by the All Tribal Students’ Union of Manipur (ATSUM) in Churachandpur turned into a flashpoint:
• Meant to oppose the High Court’s ST order, the rally drew thousands from hill communities.
• Violent counter-mobilization erupted, especially in the valley, where armed Meitei youth groups began targeting Kuki homes and churches.
Within hours, the state plunged into communal violence:
• Mobs rampaged through Kuki settlements in Imphal and nearby areas.
• In Churachandpur and Kangpokpi, retaliatory violence emerged against Meitei homes and properties.
The violence spread rapidly across 10 districts, marked by:
• Targeted arson, lynching, and house destruction.
• Destruction of over 250 churches and other minority institutions in the valley.
• Killings of civilians, including women and children, some burned alive or shot at close range.
• Displacement of entire neighborhood—often pre-marked or identified using voter records and community surveillance.
This was not random mob action, but organized ethnic cleansing, executed with precision and enabled by access to arms, vehicles, and coordination.
Two groups stood out in planning and executing violence:
• Arambai Tenggol: A radical group of Meitei men dressed in black, equipped with arms, who led attacks and checkpoint surveillance.
• Meitei Leepun: A group with similar ideology, responsible for inciting valley youth, training vigilantes, and spreading hate narratives.
Both operated with what survivors described as “state protection or non- interference”. There were accounts of police handing over looted guns to these groups or standing by during attacks.
More than 4,000 firearms and lakhs of rounds of ammunition were looted from police armories—most in full public view:
• Police and Home Department officials failed to protect these stores.
• There was no immediate effort to recover arms, and few arrests were made even months later.
• State officials offered inconsistent accounts about how the looting occurred.
Security forces, including state police, often appeared ethnically partisan, protecting Meitei mobs while ignoring Kuki appeals for help.
The violence led to the forced displacement of over 60,000 people:
• Kuki-Zo communities were driven out of the valley.
• Meitei communities left tribal-dominated hill areas.
The outcome was a de facto ethnic partition:
• Valley districts became Meitei strongholds, patrolled by armed youth groups.
• Hill districts became Kuki-Zo strongholds, inaccessible to Meitei police or politicians.
No official policy supported this division, but it was effectively enforced on the ground through fear and arms.
Chief Minister N. Biren Singh did not step down, despite mounting calls from tribal MLAs and civil society. The state government:
• Downplayed the violence as “clashes” or “disturbances.”
• Made no significant arrests of radical group leaders.
• Denied the scale of displacement and suffering.
The Prime Minister and Home Minister remained silent during the most critical days, while the Supreme Court delayed hearings. By the time relief arrived, entire communities had been uprooted.
The conflict has continued, evolving into a protracted war of attrition, with:
• Shootouts across buffer zones.
• New violence in mixed-ethnicity areas like Jiribam.
• Constant tension in relief camps, where arms are feared to be circulating.
There is no roadmap for reintegration or restitution. Communities remain trapped in ethnic enclosures, with trust completely eroded.
Chapter 4 is a critical exposé of the systematic ethnic violence that unfolded in Manipur, rooted in long-standing grievances but triggered by political and judicial insensitivity, and enabled by organized militias and state complicity.
It concludes that the violence was:
• Planned, not spontaneous.
• Ethnically targeted,
• Facilitated by state failures.
Chapter 5: Gender-Based Violence
This chapter presents the gendered impact of the conflict. It begins with a historical overview of women’s roles in Manipur’s public life, noting how women’s groups like Meira Paibi have been instrumental in peace movements but are now divided along ethnic lines.
The report documents widespread sexual violence during the conflict, including cases of gang rapes and parading of naked women. Many incidents went unreported due to fear, trauma, and lack of institutional support. Victims have received little justice, and the police have often been complicit.
The chapter also examines how women have been both victims and perpetrators. In some instances, women actively participated in looting and violence, while in others, they protected their communities and helped in negotiations. It analyzes the disproportionate burden faced by displaced women in relief camps—lack of nutrition, reproductive care, trauma support, and safety.
It concludes by emphasizing the need to include women in peacebuilding efforts and ensure gender-sensitive justice and rehabilitation mechanisms.
Chapter 6: Tracing The Causes
This chapter systematically investigates the multitude of historical, geopolitical, and socio-political causes that triggered and prolonged the conflict. It emphasizes that the violence is not merely a product of spontaneous communal hatred, but rather the result of layered narratives, state failures, and long-term systemic issues.
Refugees From Myanmar And The Free Movement Regime (FMR):
The chapter outlines how demographic anxieties were exacerbated by the steady flow of refugees, mainly from the Chin-Kuki-Zo community, fleeing military repression in Myanmar. While Meitei groups and some Naga voices described this influx as “infiltration,” the tribal communities saw it as a humanitarian crisis. The absence of a clear refugee policy and the existence of the outdated FMR—allowing limited movement across borders without documentation—worsened tensions by blurring the line between asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants.
Geo-Political Considerations:
Manipur’s proximity to international borders (Myanmar, Bangladesh) makes it a geopolitical hotspot. The state’s instability is further influenced by regional insurgent groups, arms smuggling, and alleged Chinese strategic interests. The militarized border region allows non-state actors to exploit cross-border ethnic linkages, complicating peace enforcement.
State Failure And Complicity:
Testimonies reveal a deep-rooted belief among victims that the state either allowed the violence to happen or actively participated in it. Many victims and observers attribute the flare-up of violence to the political and administrative decisions of former Chief Minister Biren Singh. There are claims that the state chose to act in the interests of Meitei majoritarianism, weaponized narratives of “illegal migrants,” and ignored early signs of violence.
Poppy Cultivation And The Drug Trade:
The chapter connects the expanding drug economy in Manipur—particularly poppy cultivation—with political patronage. Kukis are often vilified as “drug mafias,” but evidence shows that cultivation is driven by poverty, lack of alternatives, and sometimes encouraged by local political or militant networks. This narrative has been used to demonize the entire Kuki population and justify military-style policing.
Disruption of Inter-Community Harmony and Propaganda:
Propaganda through social media and communal messaging has fueled hate. Both Kuki and Meitei narratives have dehumanized each other, invoking histories of violence, betrayal, and religious difference. Rumors
and manipulated information have led to paranoia and mob justice.
Rise of Armed Militias:
New radicalized groups, especially Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, have emerged, armed, and seemingly protected by state forces. Their role in orchestrating violence, with direct access to weapons and impunity, is deeply concerning.
Chapter 7: Popular Writings In The Media
This chapter analyses the complex role of media—traditional, digital, and social—in the escalation and narrative framing of the Manipur conflict. The media is not just a passive observer in this conflict—it actively shaped public perception and escalated tensions. The report introduces two key frameworks:
• Information Disorder Theory: Differentiates between misinformation (false but not harmful), disinformation (false and harmful), and malinformation (true but used maliciously).
• Media Effects Theory: Emphasizes how media impacts societal beliefs, behaviors, and policy responses, especially in crisis contexts.
The Manipur media landscape, especially in the valley, was deeply embedded in ethno-political affiliations. Local print and YouTube media disproportionately favoured Meitei narratives and vilified the Kuki-Zo community. State-controlled narratives branded Kukis as “illegal immigrants,” “narco-terrorists,” or “drug mafias”.
• Print Media: Continued to play a dominant role, but suffered from partisan bias and lacked investigative rigor.
• YouTube and Digital Channels: These gained massive popularity for real-time updates, often spreading unverified or inflammatory content. Some channels became echo chambers for communal hatred.
• Social Media: Platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp were used to organize protests, circulate hate messages, and amplify one-sided accounts.
The Editors Guild and testimonies before the Tribunal confirm widespread media bias. Inflammatory reporting and misinformation contributed significantly to public panic and inter-communal hostility.
Journalists who attempted neutral or critical reporting were intimidated. Veteran journalists revealed a chilling uniformity in stating that the violence was orchestrated and could have been curtailed in days had the state government acted responsibly. Their accounts pointed to the complicity of the state and media in fueling and sustaining the crisis.
Chapter 8: Relief, Rehabilitation, and Rebuilding Lives
This chapter evaluates the humanitarian response to the crisis, focusing on the quality of aid, living conditions in relief camps, and long-term recovery efforts. Relief and rehabilitation are framed not just as administrative challenges but as human rights obligations. The report assesses state performance against:
• The Disaster Management Act, 2005
• The National Guidelines for Temporary Shelters (2019)
• International disaster relief standards.
Over 60,000 displaced people were housed in 350+ camps. Initial state aid included ex-gratia payments, ration kits, and temporary shelters. However, these measures were grossly inadequate, delayed, and unevenly distributed.
Relief camps suffered from:
• Poor sanitation and hygiene
• Inadequate healthcare
• Absence of mental health support
• Lack of education and livelihood restoration
The Tribunal also observes a stark disparity between Meitei and Kuki camps. Camps in the valley (mainly Meitei) received more consistent support than those in the hills (mainly Kuki).
The Joint Rapid Needs Assessment (JRNA) and Gita Mittal Committeef ound severe deficiencies in state efforts. Their recommendations—covering shelter, nutrition, sanitation, education, and psychosocial support—were largely unimplemented.
Chapter 9: Navigating Health and Mental Well-Being
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the public health and
mental well-being crisis that has unfolded as a result of the ongoing ethnic conflict in Manipur. It highlights the stark failures in healthcare delivery, the collapse of mental health support systems, and the deep psychosocial trauma experienced by survivors—particularly among displaced and vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly.
Even before the outbreak of violence in May 2023, Manipur’s healthcare landscape was marked by regional disparities and systemic neglect, especially in tribal-dominated hill areas. The state’s health indicators—such as maternal mortality, immunization rates, and access to institutional deliveries were significantly worse in districts inhabited by the Kuki-Zo and Naga communities. Infrastructure in the hill districts suffered from:
• Inadequate numbers of Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and Sub-Centres.
• Shortage of doctors, nurses, and essential medicines.
• Geographic inaccessibility and underfunded mobile health units.
This legacy of health inequity formed the backdrop against which the conflict-induced humanitarian emergency unfolded. Once violence erupted, the fragile healthcare system crumbled completely in affected regions. Several critical developments were noted:
• Targeted attacks on hospitals and clinics, particularly in tribal areas.
• Evacuation or flight of medical staff due to safety concerns.
• Looting and destruction of medical supplies and ambulances.
• Complete breakdown in referral networks and transport infrastructure.
As thousands of people were displaced and forced into relief camps, healthcare access became even more limited. Many people died not directly due to violence but from preventable and treatable conditions such as:
• Diarrhoea, respiratory infections, and fever due to overcrowding
and poor sanitation.
• Lack of access to insulin, antiretrovirals, and chronic disease medication.
• Inability to access pregnancy-related care, leading to stillbirths and maternal mortality.
In some cases, patients were denied treatment on communal lines, highlighting how the conflict undermined the ethics of medical neutrality.
Relief camps—where over 60,000 people now reside—were found to be grossly underprepared to manage even basic health needs. Field investigations and testimonies reveal:
• No structured healthcare system or stationed doctors in most camps.
• Irregular medical visits by government teams and NGOs.
• Acute shortages of medicines, hygiene products, and clean water.
• Lack of screening and quarantine for communicable diseases.
• Absence of maternal and neonatal care.
The state’s failure to follow its own Disaster Management protocols has led to secondary health disasters. Women have given birth in unsanitary tents without skilled birth attendants, and the elderly often go without essential medications.
While the physical health toll was visible, the mental health crisis remains an under-addressed and potentially longer-lasting consequence of the conflict. Key psychological impacts include:
• Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among survivors who witnessed extreme violence, including killings, rape, and arson.
• Acute anxiety and depression among displaced individuals facing uncertainty, loss of livelihood, and family separation.
• Children suffering from sleep disturbances, emotional withdrawal, bedwetting, aggression, and learning disabilities.
• Women survivors of sexual violence experiencing shame, silence, and lack of safe spaces for redressal or care.
There is no systematic mental health intervention currently in place. Relief camps lacked even basic counselling services. Psychiatrists and trauma specialists are either unavailable or not integrated into emergency health responses.
A major theme in this chapter is the invisibility of health suffering in public and political discourse. Despite widespread suffering:
• Government reports often omit or underplay health crises.
• Relief allocations prioritize security and logistics over public health.
• Official media and political speeches rarely mention trauma or long-term rehabilitation.
This silence around health, especiallo mental health, reinforces cycles of abandonment and undercuts the dignity of survivors. The chapter argues that healing must be at the heart of recovery, and not merely infrastructure rebuilding. Despite systemic failures, the chapter also documents acts of community resilience:
• Informal support networks organized by women’s groups and
NGOs have provided first-aid, emotional support, and food.
• Mobile health units set up by faith-based groups have reached some isolated camps.
• Local doctors and nurses in non-conflict zones have volunteered to support displaced populations.
These efforts, while commendable, remain insufficient without institutional backing and sustained resources.
Chapter 9 paints a sobering picture of how the ethnic conflict in Manipur has devastated the health infrastructure, especially for those already marginalized. It emphasizes that any meaningful recovery must address not only homes and schools, but bodies and minds—with dignity, care, and commitment.
Chapter 10: Justice and Accountability
This chapter presents a searing indictment of the breakdown of legal, judicial, and constitutional mechanisms in Manipur during the 2023–24 ethnic conflict. It analyzes how justice was systematically denied, dissent criminalized, and constitutional safeguards ignored—resulting in a widespread crisis of impunity.
Drawing from field testimonies, legal records, government responses, and independent findings, the chapter explores the failures of courts, police, investigative agencies, and civil society. It paints a picture of not just institutional collapse, but also state complicity and political capture.
The chapter begins with a striking observation: no significant legal deterrence was placed in the path of those committing violence, looting weapons, or spreading hate. Rather than upholding the rule of law, the justice system in Manipur appeared paralyzed or partisan.
Key symptoms of this collapse include:
• Courts failing to issue urgent directives to protect life and property.
• Delayed or absent investigations into serious crimes like gang rapes and arson.
• FIRs being selectively filed, often against members of minority communities.
• Law enforcement officers actively participating in violence or protecting only one ethnic group.
Testimonies confirm that victims were too afraid to approach police stations, and even when they did, their complaints were often ignored or redirected.
While the conflict was triggered in part by a controversial Manipur High Court order in March 2023 directing the State to consider granting Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to Meiteis, the judiciary’s post-conflict engagement was marked by:
• Silence or inaction on habeas corpus petitions and public interest litigations.
• Delayed response from the SDelaye Court, which intervened only after national outcry over viral footage of women being paraded naked.
• Lack of effort to monitor compliance with court orders on relief, rehabilitation, and investigation.
Several lawyers and human rights defenders testified that they feared filing cases locally due to threats, lack of access, and erosion of judicial independence. Some recounted how judges themselves had to flee or were under pressure from the executive.
Instead of addressing public grievances, the state deployed coercive tools to silence protest and control information. These included:
• Internet shutdowns lasting months-disrupting communication, access to information, and relief coordination.
• Use of sedition and UAPA against activists, journalists, and tribal protestors.
• Surveillance and intimidation of civil society groups and independent media.
The chapter argues that these acts violated not only domestic laws but also international human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The most disturbing aspect of this chapter is the extensive documentation of police complicity and failure of security forces to maintain neutrality.
Key observations include:
• Selective deployment of police and paramilitary forces, favoring valley (Meitei) regions over hill (Kuki-Zo) regions.
• Failure to prevent the looting of over 4,000 weapons from police armories despite advance warnings and ongoing tension.
• Visual and testimonial evidence of uniformed personnel escorting or failing to stop violent mobs.
• Absence of arrests in high-profile crimes, including mob lynchings and sexual violence.
In contrast, tribal protestors and survivors were often criminalized, evicted from relief camps, or arrested under vague charges. These dual standards undermined any semblance of impartial policing.
Despite mounting evidence of atrocities, there was no serious attempt to investigate or prosecute those responsible. The State Government:
• Failed to constitute impartial Special Investigation Teams (SITs).
• Did not seek external judicial oversight.
• Ignored requests for protection from witnesses and survivors.
• Rejected calls for the former Chief Minister’s resignation or accountability.
Although the Supreme Court eventually appointed a committee led by Justice Gita Mittal and ordered CBI oversight in specific rape cases, these interventions were narrow in scope and lacked follow-through.
The Commission of Inquiry set up under a retired Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court also faced delays, limited cooperation, and withheld evidence.
The chapter critiques not only the state, but also sections of the legal and civil society ecosystem:
• Bar associations in the valley discouraged or obstructed legal aid to
Kuki-Zo survivors.
• Meitei-dominated lawyers’ forums boycotted commissions perceived to be neutral.
• Some rights organizations took ethnocentric stances, undermining their credibility.
However, a few courageous voices- including independent journalists, women’s groups, and lawyers- continued documenting abuses and providing legal support, often at great personal risk.
The impunity and breakdown of justice in Manipur, the chapter warns, could set a dangerous precedent:
• Normalization of vigilante justice, including ethnic militias operating without legal consequence.
• Permanent alienation of tribal communities, who no longer trust state institutions.
• Institutional erosion in a conflict-ridden federal democracy where law enforcement is communalized.
The report stresses that restoring the rule of law is not just about punishmen- but about truth, accountability, reparation, and confidence-building.
Chapter 10 makes it clear that without justice, there can be no peace in Manipur. The absence of legal redress and the collapse of constitutional mechanisms have not only worsened the humanitarian crisis, but also deepened ethnic divisions.
Accountability is not optional—it is foundational to rebuilding trust, democracy, and coexistence. The report calls on India’s judiciary, Parliament, and civil society to reclaim this duty and ensure that Manipur does not become a template for future impunity.
Chapter 11: Strategies For Justice, Peace And Accountability
This chapter moves beyond diagnosis to prescription. It articulates a comprehensive roadmap to address the multi-dimensional crisis in Manipur—a conflict that has laid bare the erosion of the rule of law, the fragility of democratic institutions, and the need for inclusive peacebuilding. Drawing from constitutional principles, comparative global models, and grassroots insights, the chapter lays out strategies for justice, reconciliation, institutional reform, and social healing.
It underscores a central thesis: lasting peace in Manipur cannot be imposed by force or settled through short-term administrative fixes. It requires structural changes, community dialogue, legal accountability, and sustained moral leadership.
The chapter begins by outlining the existing constitutional mechanisms available to address the breakdown of governance in Manipur. These include:
• Article 355: Mandates the Union Government to protect a state against internal disturbance and ensure compliance with the Constitution.
• Article 356: Empowers the President to impose President’s Rule when there is a breakdown of constitutional machinery.
• Article 263: Allows for the creation of inter-state councils for coordination.
• Articles 256 and 257: Enable the Centre to direct state governance when constitutional obligations are not met.
Despite the clear eligibility of Manipur’s crisis for such interventions, the
Union Government failed to act, even as constitutional order visibly disintegrated. The Tribunal views this inaction as dereliction of constitutional responsibility.
The chapter calls for urgent activation of these provisions, not as punitive tools, but as mechanisms to restore democratic governance, civilian safety, and institutional credibility.
Any meaningful peace process must begin with the identification and inclusion of all stakeholders. The chapter proposes a three-phase dialogue architecture:
Phase 1: Enumeration and Mapping
• Identify all formal and informal actors: tribal and Meitei communities, civil society organizations, religious leaders, women’s groups, student unions, displaced persons, and victims’ collectives.
• Ensure proportional representation from affected districts and ethnic groups.
Phase 2: Dialogue and Trust-Building
• Establish multi-tiered platforms for intra-group, inter-group, and state-level discussions.
• Facilitate confidence-building measures such as safe return agreements, resource-sharing negotiations, and joint memorialization efforts.
• Involve neutral peacebuilders and mediators, including human rights institutions, faith-based organizations, and international peace experts where needed.
Phase 3: Implementation and Monitoring
• Create Peacebuilding Task Forces in each district with judicial, administrative, and civil society members.
• Track commitments on justice, reparation, and rehabilitation.
• Monitor hate speech, communal violence indicators, and early-warning signs of escalation.
The chapter draws heavily on comparative transitional justice models, showing how other deeply divided societies have moved from conflict to reconciliation. Key examples include:
• South Africa: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which emphasized truth-telling, amnesty in exchange for confession, and national healing.
• Rwanda: Gacaca courts for community-based justice post-genocide.
• Northern Ireland: The Good Friday Agreement that institutionalized shared governance and power devolution.
• Colombia: Transitional justice processes for FARC militants, emphasizing victim participation and land restitution.
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in post-conflict accountability.
The report emphasizes that Manipur must adapt—not import—such mechanisms. The local context, including India’s federal structure, cultural diversity, and constitutional framework, requires homegrown innovations in restorative justice.
Building on Chapter 10, this section outlines concrete legal and institutional reforms, including:
• Special Investigative Teams (SITs) for high-profile crimes, monitored by the Supreme Court.
• Independent Prosecution Units to prevent political interference in trials.
• Victim and Witness Protection Programs, especially for survivors of gender-based violence.
• Fast-track courts for conflict-related crimes.
• Truth-telling processes: Public hearings, survivor testimonies, and community documentation initiatives.
It also advocates for restorative justice, which prioritizes acknowledgment of harm, reparations, and reintegration over mere punishment. This could take the form of apology ceremonies, symbolic reparations, or community-led resolution boards.
Justice alone cannot heal the social rupture in Manipur. The chapter stresses civic rebuilding through:
• Peace Education: Introduce curricula that promote empathy, constitutional literacy, and inter-community dialogue.
• Countering Hate Speech: Establish monitoring cells to identify, report, and respond to online and offline hate.
• Media Literacy: Promote critical thinking and digital awareness, particularly among youth.
• Youth Engagement: Mobilize youth leadership in peacebuilding and create employment programs that bridge ethnic divides. It also emphasizes the central role of women and faith leaders as agents of peace, drawing from feminist peacebuilding traditions and interfaith reconciliation models.
To ensure sustainability, the chapter recommends:
• Setting up a National Peace Commission with a multi-year mandate.
• Funding long-term research on ethnic violence, post-conflict trauma, and institutional reform.
• Creating a Manipur Peace Index to track indicators of safety, integration, and justice delivery.
It argues that ad hoc or episodic interventions will not suffice. Only systematic, monitored, and resourced processes can rebuild trust between the state and its citizens.
Chapter 11 is a call to reimagine Manipur’s future—not just through trials and compensation, but through dialogue, inclusion, truth-telling, and civic revival. It insists that peace must be built with the people, not just for them, and that the Indian state must fulfill its constitutional obligation to protect all its citizens equally.
The strategies proposed in this chapter are ambitious but not utopian. They draw from global lessons, local resilience, and constitutional values. If implemented sincerely, they can help transform Manipur from a site of ethnic rupture to a model of democratic recovery.
Chapter 12: Summing Up
As of July, 2025, more than 26 months have passed since 3rd May, 2023, when the ethnic violence first erupted. The state of Manipur still remains a disturbed state – far away from normalcy and peace. Though Biren Singh, the former Chief Minister under whose watch the conflict burst and simmered for unconscionably long periods, has resigned, and President’s Rule has been imposed, there appears to be little interest, concern or political will to bring back normalcy to the state.
The Independent People’s Tribunal was initiated by PUCL out of growing concern at the continuing violence and instability in Manipur, and a sense of responsibility to understand and provide a studied response to the situation, under the backdrop of the historical tensions that have plagued Manipuri society. The Tribunal consisting of retired judges and public officials, lawyers, journalists, activists and experts, have delved into the various facts and facets of the conflict through first-hand accounts, visits to the affected areas, meeting with officials, with a view to understand the situation on the ground.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties is a human rights organisation striving to defend civil liberties and democratic rights of all members of society.
This report is a reproduction of PUCL
Visit the link for more detail:
https://pucl.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Manipur-Report-FINAL-1.pdf
